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The Differing Effects of Individual and Group Incentive Pay 








Abstract: We investigate the role of individual incentive (II) and group incentive (GI) pay as 
determinants of worker separation using a large panel data set from Finland during 1997-2006. For 
white-collar workers, GI pay is associated significantly with an increased probability of separation 
(diminished employment stability), but in large firms only. For blue-collar workers, II pay is 
associated with a decreased probability of separation (enhanced employment stability), in both 
small and large firms. By providing results for different forms of performance pay in a single study, 
some of our findings are quite novel. In accounting for differences in our empirical findings 
compared to those in earlier studies, our results suggest that outcomes depend on the differing 
institutional contexts found in coordinated market economies (such as Finland) and liberal market 
economies.   
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The rapid diffusion of performance related pay (PRP), a key element of HRM, is a phenomenon 
underway in many economies. In tandem with the increasing use of PRP, a rich literature from 
multiple disciplines has emerged to investigate diverse issues such as the impact of PRP on firm 
performance. However, one area in this research that has received less attention is how different 
types of PRP schemes, including both individual incentive pay (linking pay to individual 
performance) and group incentive pay (tying pay to group performance) are related to employee 
turnover.  
Turnover is an important issue since much evidence shows that employee turnover rates 
can be excessive in many industrialized labor markets (e.g. Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999). Firms 
may dislike undue turnover of full-time workers because it is associated with search and selection 
costs. Many full-time workers too may have an aversion to high turbulence in labor markets. 
More stable employment relationships provide stronger incentives for incumbent employees as 
well as firms to invest in firm-specific human capital. Also, if worker separation is due to 
displacement, displaced workers may face extensive and long-lasting wage and earning losses 
after job termination (see, e.g., Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan, 1993; Couch and Placzek, 
2010; Korkeamäki and Kyyrä, 2014). In this study, our turnover variable is defined as the 
separation of an individual from the company for whatever reason. We use a large linked 
employer-employee dataset-- where observations are individual employees, but we are able to use 
information on firm characteristics at the same time.  
Much previous empirical work on this theme tends to focus on how only one particular 
form of PRP, namely profit sharing, a group incentive pay scheme, is related to worker separation 
(e.g. Chelius and Smith, 1990; Kruse, 1992). Using our rich linked employer-employee panel 
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data set, we are able to investigate the impact on worker separation of differing types of PRP 
including individual incentive pay, where individual worker performance is used as a primary 
measure of performance, and group incentive pay, where group performance (such as team output 
and firm-level profit) is used as a primary measure of performance. Further, unlike previously 
published studies on the topic, we are able to use matched employee-employer data. These data 
are especially suitable for studying turnover at the individual level, because they also permit 
controls for confounding variables at the levels of both employee and firm characteristics to be 
included. 
As we discuss in more detail later, the theoretical literature on the expected overall 
direction of the impact of PRP on turnover is ambiguous and does not pay sufficient attention to 
differing institutional context. In addition, most previous empirical studies linking PRP to worker 
turnover focus on “liberal market economies” (LMEs) especially the U.S. (e.g. O’Halloran, 2012) 
and the U.K. (e.g. Green and Heywood, 2011). While as Bryson et al. (2012) note, the coverage 
of incentive pay schemes among European countries is the largest in the Nordic countries, 
notably Finland where it is around 30% of employees and surpassed only by the U.S. (over 40% 
of employees), there are no published studies on how PRP matters for worker separation in 
“coordinated market economies” (CMEs) such as Finland. However, the institutional 
characteristics of CMEs such as strong wage compression and long tradition of mutual trust 
between employee and employer representatives can be expected to lead to large differences in 
the way that PRP affects worker separation compared to institutional characteristics in LMEs. 
Hence our analysis of Finnish panel data provides some of the first evidence on how PRP is 
related to worker separation in a CME. Our rich data enable us to include a wider range of 
covariates than previous work, including measures for wage dispersion (e.g. Riddell, 2012), 
working conditions (such as undesirable work schedules, e.g. Cottini et al., 2011), and regional 
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controls that may influence turnover e.g. through labor market conditions (e.g. Booth et al., 
1999). 
Our findings indicate that group and individual incentive pay matter for worker separation 
as do many of our covariates. But our specific findings sometimes differ than those emerging 
from studies of LMEs. In particular we find that: (i) individual incentive pay and group incentive 
pay may affect employment stability differently. Perhaps surprisingly and in contrast to much of 
previous literature, group-based PRP is not associated with greater employment stability, whereas 
individual PRP is (for blue-collar workers); (ii) In general, white-collar and blue-collar workers 
respond to PRP differently. In accounting for differences in empirical findings across various 
settings, one possible explanation is that outcomes depend on the differing institutional contexts 
found in CMEs (such as Finland) and LMEs.   
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide a conceptual framework 
and review related empirical work. Section 3 describes our data and presents summary statistics. 
In Section 4 we outline our empirical strategy. Section 5 reports our key findings. The final 
section provides conclusions and discusses implications. 
2. Conceptual Framework and Prior Studies  
When reviewing existing studies of worker separation under PRP, the fundamental concern is the 
expected overall direction of the possible association between PRP and worker separation. There 
are several strands of literature that are directly relevant here.  
Conceptual framework 
One argument often discussed in the compensation literature is based on Vroom’s (1964) 
expectancy theory (see e.g. Magnan and St. Ogne, 2005). This so-called “line of sight” argument 
posits that for PRP to influence behavior, employees must expect that they can influence the 
5 
 
measure of PRP and that they will be compensated according to that measure. The more distant 
the measure and the more complicated the PRP system, the weaker are the effects. For instance, if 
compensation is related to profitability, but profitability is determined largely by other issues than 
employee effort (e.g. by general market outlook or strategic decisions made by management), 
then the line of sight in such a compensation system is arguably weak. On the other hand, when 
payment is tied closely to a measure that employees actually can influence, like the number of 
pieces produced, then the productivity effects of PRP systems can be quite significant (Lazear, 
2000).  
The free-rider argument (e.g. Knez and Simester, 2001) is related but distinct from line of 
sight issues. When employees are rewarded on the basis of team rather than individual output, 
there is a tendency for individual employees to free ride on the efforts of team members, leading 
to a suboptimal effort levels. This problem is more pronounced the larger the team on which 
output results is based. While the problem can be remedied by suitable mutual monitoring 
systems, it can be especially pronounced under profit-sharing and stock-based schemes. 
The line of sight effect (together with the related free-rider effect) have often been cited as 
arguments against the efficacy of collective pay systems based on firm profitability or share price 
for non-managerial employees (e.g. Hall and Murphy, 2002). However, there is an empirical 
counterargument-- the bulk of the evidence finds that collective pay systems are positively related 
to performance (e.g. Kruse et al., 2010). Also there are questions related to their extensive use 
(Bryson et al., 2012): If collective systems are so ineffective from an incentives perspective, why 
are they so commonly used? 
One of the more sophisticated arguments explaining the use of group-based PRP relates to 
fairness and reciprocity. Employees may perceive profit-sharing of stock-based compensation as 
fair conduct by employers and elicit more effort in response as a form of gift exchange (Akerlof; 
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1982; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Cappelli et al., 2019). This is also related to earlier managerial and 
psychological literature suggesting that PRP and especially collective pay systems help to retain 
employees through enhancing employee commitment (e.g. Florkowski, 1987), job satisfaction 
(e.g. Long, 1980), and worker motivation (e.g. Hammer et al., 1981).  
These arguments have implications for turnover as well. If employees view collective 
PRP systems as confusing and unrewarding, then they may vote with their feet. Conversely, if 
pay systems are aligned with employee expectations, this may encourage employees to stay at the 
firm. 
The issues of PRP and turnover are closely linked with the literature of PRP and employee 
sorting. One of the main predictions arising from that literature is that individual PRP leads to 
higher inequality in pay and to quits by the least productive employees, while more productive 
employees are likely to be better off under PRP systems based on individual performance 
(Lazear, 1986). If employees are risk averse, their degree of risk aversion becomes an additional 
parameter to consider in the quit decision.  
Under a collective PRP system, the sorting issue is less straightforward. To the extent 
collective pay systems reduce wage inequality, they may work against the interest of the most 
able employees. The least able employees may in turn face peer pressure to improve their 
performance, which may lead to further quits (Hamilton et al., 2004). Thus collective pay 
systems may sort out both the most and least productive employees (Weiss, 1987). In this paper, 
we focus on employee turnover rather than employee sorting, because we do not have direct data 
on employee performance. 
There are also other mechanisms through which PRP systems may affect employee 
turnover. One of the most influential theories in this regard is the share economy arguments of 
Weitzman (1984), based primarily on profit-sharing. While under conventional payment systems 
7 
 
wages are inflexible and employment flexible, it is claimed that under profit-sharing wages 
become flexible and employment would be stabilized. The argument led to a considerable 
theoretical debate (see e.g. Nordhaus, 1988) and to extensive empirical testing (to be reviewed 
later). However, a clear prediction emerging from that literature is that collective PRP systems 
would be associated with less worker turnover. 
More recently, the literature has investigated complementarities between PRP and 
acquisition of firm-specific human capital through training. PRP might increase returns to firm-
specific training and thereby reduce separations. The literature has focused especially on profit-
sharing and training (Gielen, 2011; Green and Heywood, 2011; Kraft and Lang, 2013), but 
Guthrie (2000) has made a similar argument in the context of individual PRP.  
Finally, there is a literature considering the effects of variable pay on workplace injuries 
(e.g. Bender and Ioannis, 2014) and on psychological stress in the workplace (e.g. Pouliakas and 
Theodossiu, 2009). This literature is often critical on the impact of PRP, maintaining that PRP 
(and in particular, individual PRP) leads to lower job satisfaction and thereby to more quits. 
To sum up, there are conflicting predictions related to different PRP systems. Group PRP 
systems may be associated with higher employee turnover, if line of sight considerations 
dominate and employees view the pay system as confusing. On the other hand, group PRP 
systems may lead to less turnover if PRP leads to stronger employee identification with the firm 
(consistent with the gift exchange view). Also Group PRP systems may also lead into less 
turnover if they lead into more downward flexibility of wages. Similarly with individual PRP 
systems there are forces pushing the effect on employee turnover in different directions. 
Individual PRP systems may be associated with lower employee turnover if they align 
employees’ expectations about the link between compensation and job tasks. However, 
individual PRP systems may lead into higher turnover if they lead into higher psychological and 
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physical stress. Also, by increasing pay variability, both types of PRP may increase turnover 
among risk-averse employees. In sum, theory is ambiguous as to the predicted net effects on 
separation for both individual and group PRP. 
Moreover, in thinking about which of these net effects for individual and group PRP 
might be expected to dominate, predictions are further complicated by specific institutional 
arrangements in Finland. Based on previous evidence, (see e.g. Kalmi and Kauhanen (2006); 
Gooderham et al. (2015); and Jones et al. (2017)), we believe that the institutional framework 
might be an important determinant for employee outcomes (though this has been largely ignored 
in the context of worker turnover). Finland (and other CMEs) have compressed wage structures 
and industrial relations climates characterized as collaborative and trust intensive (e.g. Godard, 
2004). By comparative international standards, the statutory protection of employee rights in 
Finland is robust and union density is very high (around 70% during the period of this study). 
This contrasts with LMEs where characteristically commitment and trust are low, and 
employment relationships are typically at arms’ length. We hypothesize that the effects of PRP 
on worker turnover in these differing institutional environments can be expected to be dissimilar. 
For instance, the variance of pay introduced by PRP schemes can be expected to be lower in 
CMEs where union influence is prevalent; this may mean that any effects, either on work 
incentives or turnover intentions, can be rather curtailed in CMEs compared to LMEs. Also since 
different groups may perceive the costs and benefits of these institutional set-ups differently, the 
responses to PRP may also differ across actors such as blue and white collar workers.  
Previous empirical analysis 
The early studies on the effects of PRP on employee turnover were largely inspired by 
Weitzman’s (1984) share economy hypothesis. The results indicated modest support for the 
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hypothesis, showing a negative relationship between the presence of profit-sharing and employee 
turnover, even though the precise mechanism remained unclear (Chelius and Smith, 1990; Kruse, 
1992). Also later studies on the link between profit-sharing and employee separation have found 
this negative relationship (Azfar and Danninger (2001) and Green and Heywood (2011) using 
individual data from the US and the UK, respectively).  
To our knowledge studies looking at the effects of individual PRPs on employee turnover 
are scarcer than those pertaining to collective PRP. The sorting effect described earlier is well 
known through Lazear’s (1986; 2000) theoretical and empirical work. However, the effect on 
overall turnover is difficult to infer from sorting: while less productive employees may be 
induced to leave, this may be compensated by the higher likelihood of more productive 
employees remaining in the firm.  
An early study on the effects of a type of PRP other than profit-sharing is Blakemore et al. 
(1987), who found that bonus payments reduced employee turnover. Two studies explicitly 
contrasting individual- and group level PRPs are Guthrie (2000) and O’Halloran (2012). The 
former is a rare study: a positive association between group level PRP and turnover is found, 
while individual-level PRP reduces turnover. Moreover, Guthrie (2000) finds that the positive 
(turnover-inducing) effect is increasing in group size. However, O’Halloran (2012) finds that 
profit-sharing is associated with less turnover, whereas other forms of PRP do not have a 
statistically significant association with turnover. 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Data 
An attractive feature of our study is the use of matched firm-individual panel data, while 
earlier studies have been based either on firm-level data (Chelius and Smith, 1990; Kruse, 1992; 
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Guthrie, 2000) or individual-level data (Azfar and Danninger, 2001; Green and Heywood, 2011). 
Our register-based data are obtained from the Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK) payroll 
records for its member firms, which imply they are likely to be less-prone to various 
measurement errors (e.g. recall errors) that data used in previous studies may suffer from. 
Further, we can consider how much of worker earnings were actually based on these performance 
schemes—the intensive margin (Jones et al., 2017), while previous studies, by relying on survey-
collected data, typically can only measure whether a worker has received any form of PRP (i.e. 
the presence of PRP sometimes called the extensive margin, Jones et al., 2017).1  
As providing payroll information to the EK is voluntary for member firms with fewer 
than 30 persons, to avoid potential sample selection bias this may induce, we exclude these firms 
from our sample. Also excluded from the records is information on top management and on 
workers who are either owners of the firm or are relatives of these owners. The full data cover 
about 70 percent of all workers in manufacturing in Finland, and hence are representative of the 
population of Finnish workers in this sector. In terms of the overall Finnish economy, the EK’s 
data account for about a third of all private sector workers in Finland (Uusitalo and Vartiainen, 
2008). Most importantly, the data provide a unique source of information on the type of 
compensation (e.g. whether a worker in a given year has received some form of PRP). In 
addition, the data provide information on worker characteristics (e.g. job tenure, education, age, 
and employer identifiers), job characteristics (e.g. occupation and job schedules) and firm 
characteristics (e.g. firm size and firm performance).  
We restrict our analysis to full-time manufacturing workers from 1997 to 2006, and 
undertake analyses for white-collar and blue-collar male workers separately.2 While full-time 
white-collar workers receive a monthly salary, we use 30 hours per week as the cut-off for full-
time blue-collar workers. To help to overcome problems introduced by high turnover of younger 
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workers and early retirement schemes for older workers, we confine our analysis to workers who 
are aged 25-53 years old. Importantly, our analysis is also restricted to male workers only since 
the proportion of female manufacturing workers in our sample is rather low-- 14% (22%) among 
white-collar (blue-collar) workers.3 Also, as discussed later on, we cannot make a distinction 
between two types of turnover, namely job-to-job versus job-to-non-employment, and in 
understanding the turnover patterns of women, this feature has been shown to be quite important 
for women, and any analysis of turnover of female workers without distinguishing job-to-non-
employment from job-to-job would be less useful (Royalty, l998). 
Most previous studies identify worker exit events using measures that are derived from 
survey information on worker intentions to move (e.g. Sousa-Poza and Henneberg, 2004; 
Weisberg and Kirschenbaum, 1991). By contrast, we measure separations using actual changes 
in employer-worker matches, based on the employer firm ID code changes, from one year to the 
next.4 In contrast to studies that assess inter-firm (or inter-industry) variations in separation rates 
using cross-sectional data, we follow actual job spells and switches of employees for a long time-
period, specifically from 1997 to 2006. We also require that each firm exists at least three 
consecutive years in the data.  
We recognize some limitations of our measure of worker separation. First, our data do not 
allow us to distinguish firm-initiated involuntary layoffs from worker-initiated voluntary quits. 
However, this is also a shortcoming of some previous studies (e.g. Böckerman and Ilmakunnas, 
2009). We try to minimize the problem of voluntary vs. involuntary separations by focusing on 
full-time employees because, in Finland, these workers enjoy strong employment protection.  
And in the absence of severe economic downturns during the study period, we are reasonably 
confident that the bulk of separations are voluntary. In any event, on theoretical grounds, the 
distinction between layoffs and quits is also ambiguous because employers can always try to 
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hound their workers out of a job (e.g. by reducing worker wages, reallocating work-tasks, or 
providing generous severance payment for volunteer movers).5 Another shortcoming is that we 
do not have information on the characteristics of workers’ families such as partners’ age, earnings 
and the number of children. Further, worker separation events in the sample may consist of job-
to-job transitions within the data (to another EK firm) as well as out-of-job transitions (to outside 
of the data), but we do not make a distinction between these two exit channels in our models. One 
reason for this is that, in the latter case, a worker can move either to unemployment, or out of the 
labor force or to employment in non-EK firms (e.g., small firms or other sectors), but our data do 
not allow us to distinguish among these three different forms of transitions. Finally, we are 
unable to control for the effect of job satisfaction on worker separation due to data limitations, 
unless job dissatisfaction arises from inter-firm wage inequality, job characteristics, level of 
earnings, job scheduling hazards, or worker age and tenure. We also use in our estimations firm 
fixed effects to control for firm (time-invariant) characteristics such as management expertise and 
HRM systems, each of which might have bearings on job satisfaction.        
The most important and novel aspect of this study, however, is our ability to analyze 
whether two specific forms of PRP, namely group incentive (GI) pay and individual incentive (II) 
pay, after controlling for a rich set of important covariates, have different implications for worker 
separation in a coordinated market economy. The classifications of the specific pay schemes we 
investigate are based on our conversations with EK’s experts, our reading of EK’s PRP 
publications as well as our prior knowledge gleaned from studies of PRP in Finnish companies 
(e.g. Jones et al., 2006; Jones et al., 2010a; Jones et al., 2010b; Jones et al., 2012; Jones et al., 
2017; Kalmi and Sweins, 2010). Profit Sharing in Finland is similar to profit sharing in other 
countries such as the U.S. and Japan (see, for example, Kruse, 1992 for the U.S. and Kato and 
Morishima, 2003 for Japan). It is a group incentive pay scheme linking individual worker’s pay 
13 
 
to firm-level performance, typically profit. As in the case of U.S. profit sharing, profit sharing in 
Finland can be either a cash plan (paid in cash to individual workers) or a deferred plan 
(contributed to the personnel fund). In our data we only have information on the former. This 
scheme is clearly a group incentive pay scheme.  
Gainsharing in Finland is typically not negotiated in collective agreements and is set by 
management. In other words, firms can unilaterally decide the adoption of gainsharing, without 
union involvement. Perhaps the most common example is an annually-paid cash bonus scheme. 
Its amount is often determined by how well performance targets are reached or surpassed. The 
targets are typically set at the group or unit-level. Amongst upper-white collar workers, in some 
cases, the group-level performance measures may have been complemented with the individual-
level performance measures (e.g. how well an individual project has succeeded). However, our 
understanding is that gainsharing schemes with only the individual-level performance measures 
were highly atypical, if any, in the sample period. Compared to profit sharing performance can be 
measured at a more local level, as in the case of most gainsharing plans in the U.S. and other 
advanced market economies. Gainsharing is largely a group incentive pay scheme.  
Piece Rates is traditionally a payment scheme used when an individual worker’s output 
can be measured rather easily and accurately. Usually a worker’s pay is proportional to the 
quantity of output he produces. Not too surprisingly, piece rates are only used among blue-collar 
workers in our data. It is mostly an individual incentive pay scheme although in Finland it is 
possible that in some cases piece rates include a scheme making a minor part of worker’s pay 
proportional to the quantity of output produced by her and her colleagues in the same work unit 
such as team. This scheme is largely an individual incentive scheme.  
Finally, Reward Pay is similar to piece rates. It is mostly based (partly or fully) on 
individual performance rather than individual workload. Examples of performance measures 
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include quantity of work (quantity reward), quality of work (quality reward) or some other 
performance measure at the individual level. As such, it is typically an individual incentive pay 
scheme. Sales commissions and production bonuses are examples of reward pay. Reward pay is 
common in paper and technology industries. As shown below, reward pay is much more common 
amongst blue-collar workers. This scheme is mostly an individual incentive scheme.  
Our individual-level data on worker and job characteristics provide information on several 
important covariates. We can control for Sunday overtime and Shift work which traditionally 
have been viewed as important dimensions of undesirable work schedules or job scheduling 
arrangements; both equal one if a worker has received Sunday overtime and/or a shift work 
payment in a given year and zero otherwise. Rather unusually in the literature on separation, we 
also are able to include the standard deviation of worker annual earnings within-firm as a control 
for intra-firm wage dispersion, a potential source of job dissatisfaction, calculated separately for 
white-collar and blue-collar worker groups within the firm.6  
To deal with unobserved heterogeneity across firms (such as management expertise and 
HRM systems), we include firm fixed effects as controls. Also we use a broad set of industry and 
occupational dummy variables to account for differences in adverse workplace conditions across 
industries and occupations, separately for white-collar and blue-collar workers. Also in Finland 
working conditions are largely regulated by collective agreements between employee and 
employer representatives along industrial lines. For white-collar workers we use 24 and for blue-
collar workers 30 manufacturing industry dummies. While industry and occupational dummy 
variables may not fully capture adverse conditions, this may not be an issue here due to the 
availability of a strong voice option through a high-level of unionization over a long period in 
Finland, suggesting Finnish workers under adverse workplace conditions are more likely to 
choose the voice option first rather than the exit option. Hence we expect worker separations in 
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Finland to be less sensitive to adverse workplace conditions and worker discontent than in 
countries with low-levels of unionization (for the exit-voice theory of trade unions, see Freeman 
(1980) and Freeman and Medoff (1984)). We also note that related empirical work has tended to 
focus on countries in which unionization rates are far from “high” (such as the U.S. or the U.K.). 
By contrast, since the late 1960s in Finland unionization rates have been around 70-80% and 
collective agreements between employer’ and employee’ representatives have covered about 90% 
of the workforce. Moreover, collective bargaining and centralized income agreements are usually 
also binding for nonunion workers. These “co-ordinated market” features of the Finnish labor 
market (especially when compared with the much more LMEs of the U.S. and the U.K.) provide 
an interesting environment to assess the impact of PRP on worker separation.  
 Similarly, we use the formal level of education to account for the heterogeneity of 
workers in their education.7 We also take into account firm type and perform regressions for large 
(employment>100) and small firms (employment<100) separately. To account for the impact of 
differences in local labor market conditions on quit behavior, we use annual regional 
unemployment rates. To control for time-invariant differences across regions (i.e. Southern, 
Western, Eastern, Lower North, and Upper North provinces), we also include regional fixed 
effects as controls. 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for key variables for white-collar male workers. The 
overall number of white-collar male workers in the data consists of 1,187,583 worker-year 
observations, or 218,630 workers. A small number of workers with multiple job spells within a 
year were excluded. After dropping anyone who does not meet any one of our three inclusion 
criteria (full-time; age 25-53; and working in firms with 30 or more employees), our final sample 
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for white-collar workers consists of 229,117 worker-year observations, or 58,749 workers. The 
unconditional separation rate (sample mean) is 0.12. The average size of (realized) group 
incentive pay is about 5% of worker annual total earnings, or about 2,250 euros. In turn the 
incidence of group incentive pay is 0.57. Concerning undesirable work schedules, the incidence 
of Sunday overtime work is more common than shift work.  
Table 2 reports summary statistics for blue-collar male workers. The overall number of 
blue-collar male workers consists of 2,070,940 worker-year observations, or 389,227 workers. 
After dropping anyone who does not meet any one of our three inclusion criteria (full-time; age 
25-53; and working in firms with 30 or more employees) we end up with 340,344 worker-year 
observations, or 80,338 workers. The unconditional separation rate (sample mean) is 0.17, 
implying somewhat larger separation risk than for white-collar workers. Reassuringly our 
numbers for white-collar and blue-collar male worker separation are in line with previous 
findings for Finland – for example, Theodossiou and Zangelidis (2009) found about a 14% 
probability for men of moving either to another job or non-employment. The average size of 
group incentive pay is close 4% of worker annual total earnings, or about 1,000 euros. More 
importantly, the average size of individual incentive pay is 16.6% of worker total annual 
earnings, or about 4,700 euros. The incidence of group incentive pay is 0.17, while the incidence 
of individual incentive pay is 0.39.8 With an incidence rate about 0.85, undesirable work 
schedules are common among blue-collar workers. Comparing between Tables 1 and 2 also 





4. Empirical strategy 
To motivate our empirical analysis, we follow Frederiksen (2009). In a standard model of 
job separations and labor market flows the value of an employment match is a function of an 
individual’s characteristics (e.g. age, education), job factors (e.g. undesirable work schedules, 
occupation, PRP) and firm characteristics (e.g. employer size, earnings inequality, firm 
performance, industry). The value of the current employment match (𝑉 ) can be characterized as 
follows:   
(1)  𝑉 = 𝑓 𝑊 , 𝐽 , 𝐹 , 𝜀 , 
where Wit is the vector of individual worker characteristics, 𝐽  is the vector of job factors, 𝐹  is 
the vector of firm characteristics and 𝜀  is a random component (i.e. the value of the match is not 
known with certainty). Superscript C refers to the worker’s current employer. Within the current 
job spell in t-1, in subsequent period t the worker has an option to continue with the current 
match or to separate. If we assume that the worker separates and starts work for an alternative 
employer (A), the alternative employer may value worker characteristics (Wit) differently from 
the current employer (C). Likewise, job factors and firm characteristics are likely to differ 
between the current and the alternative employer (e.g., we might write 𝐽 = 𝑥 𝐽  and 𝐹 =
𝑧 𝐹 ). This implies that the value of the alternative match differs from the value of the current 
match (𝑉 = 𝑓 𝑊 , 𝐽 , 𝐹 , 𝜀 ≠ 𝑉 ). Since initially the worker has decided to work for the 
current employer, it must be the case that 𝑉 > 𝑉 . However, changes in the arguments of 𝑓  in 
subsequent periods might make the alternative employment match economically more attractive 




  We apply the linear probability model (LPM) for the conditional probability that worker 
i separates from firm j in year t, given that worker employment match has lasted until the end of 
the previous year t-1. We use the LPM approach (rather than potential alternative empirical 
approaches such as probit) for the reasons discussed in Bellemare et al. (2015).  First, as 
discussed above below, controlling for a large number of firm fixed effects is of importance in 
our estimations. The use of nonlinear procedures in our context makes the results vulnerable to 
the incidental parameter problem. Second, we use robust standard errors to account for 
heteroscedasticity, a shortcoming of LPM. Third, LPM avoids identification by the specific 
functional forms that nonlinear procedures assume. Our main focus is on how the probability of 
worker separation in year t is associated with the incidence of PRP in year t-1. For blue-collar 
workers our measure of PRP includes both individual incentive pay and group incentive pay, 
while for white-collar workers PRP contains only group incentive pay. We restrict our empirical 
analysis to the first separation event to avoid complications of multiple separations of same 
worker in estimations. In short, we model a conditional probability for the termination of single 
job spell. Because worker observations within the same firm may be correlated, standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level.  
For white-collar workers we estimate the following linear probability model for a 
conditional probability of worker separation:  












ti FEYEARFEFIRMXGIXYP ,131,21,11,101, __)|1(     
In Eq. (2) the dependent variable, WCtiY , , equals one if the white-collar male worker i separates 
from his current job match year t, 0 otherwise. Our key focus in Eq. (2) is on 1 , which measures 
the association between the incidence of group incentive pay year t-1 and the separation event in 
next year t, conditional on a broad set of one-year lagged covariates year. Reflecting our earlier 
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discussion, the vector WCtiX 1,  includes controls for worker characteristics (age categories, formal 
level of education, earnings quartile within the firm), job characteristics (dummies for job 
scheduling hazards, 3-digit occupational dummies, job tenure in year 1997), firm characteristics 
(industry, size (6 categories), earnings inequality (within firm standard deviation of worker 
earnings), and regional characteristics (regional dummies and annual regional unemployment 
rate (%)). Firm fixed effects ( WCtjFEFIRM 1,_  ) are included to capture time-invariant 
heterogeneity across firms (e.g. persistence in firm productivity and managerial practices). Year 
dummies ( WCtFEYEAR 1_  ) control for macroeconomic effects that are common to all white-collar 
workers.   
For blue-collar workers we modify Eq. (2) to include the incidence of individual incentive 
pay ( BCtiII 1,  ). Specifically, we estimate the following linear probability model for a conditional 

















ti FEYEARFEFIRMXIIGIXYP ,131,21,11,21,101, __)|1(     
 In Eq. (3) our dependent variable, BCtiY , , equals one if the worker separates in year t from 
his job match year t-1, 0 otherwise. Our interest lies in the parameters of BCtiGI 1,   and 
BC
tiII 1,  , i.e. 1
and 2 . The vector of one-year lagged covariates included in Eq. (2) is as in Eq. (1). Because 
there can be important differences in worker separation across small and large firms, we also 
estimate Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) separately for small (employment <100) and large 
(employment>100) firms. This definition for small firms was used in prior studies such as 




5. Findings  
Table 3 reports our key findings for white-collar worker separation under incentive pay, 
after controlling for heterogeneity across workers, jobs and firms. Our key focus is on whether 
group incentive pay (measured as % of the worker annual total earnings) in the previous year (t-
1) is associated with worker separation in the subsequent year (t).  
In column (1), for the full sample of firms, we find a positive and statistically significant 
association (10% level) between worker separation and group incentive pay. The estimated 
coefficient on group incentive pay, 0.002, indicates that a 10-percentage-point increase in the 
share of group incentive pay is associated with about a 2 percentage points (pp) greater risk of 
separation.   
Turning to other explanatory variables in column (1), we find that the estimated 
coefficient of earnings inequality is positive but insignificantly associated with worker 
separation. The odds of separation for workers in the fourth quartile of the earnings distribution 
are found to be not significantly different from workers in the third quartile. However, workers 
belonging to the first (second) quartile of the firm earnings distribution are 1.1 pp (0.5 pp) more 
likely to separate than workers in third quartile, both at the 1% significance. Given that quartiles 
of the firm earnings distribution also reflect differences in employee’s marginal product of labor, 
this implies a greater risk of separation for lower productivity workers. Both measures of 
undesirable work conditions are negatively associated with worker separation. The estimates of 
Sunday overtime work and shift work are both negatively (-0.009) significant at the 5% level. We 
interpret this negative association as evidence of compensating differentials. 
 Compared with prime-aged workers 40-44 years old, workers in the 30-34 and 35-39 
years old age-groups have a strongly statistically significant and positively association with 
separation. For example, the parameter estimate for the former group implies about a 2.0 pp 
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greater risk of separation, while for workers in the latter group the separation risk is about 1 pp. 
greater, while the separation risk for workers 45-49 years old is about 0.7 pp lower. The oldest 
group of workers 50-53 years old is consistently associated with about 19 pp greater risk of separation 
at the 1 % level. The association between educational level and separation is positively significant 
for primary-level education as well as for bachelor-level or above (compared with the reference 
group of tertiary-level educated workers). For example, workers with primary-level and masters-
level education are associated with an enhanced risk of separation (by about 2 pp). For highly-
educated workers, this finding is consistent with skill-biased technological change (e.g. Autor et 
al. 1998).  
In columns (2)-(3) we split the white-collar sample by employer size (cut-off is 100 
workers) and report findings for small and large firms separately. Concerning group incentive 
pay, we continue to find that group incentive pay is positively associated with worker separation, 
but only in large firms. The size of the parameter estimate is 0.002 and it is significant at 10% 
level.  This is consistent with the argument that that the line of sight – issues might be more 
pronounced in larger organizations, where profitability is largely outside the influence of typical 
employees.  
For other covariates the findings in columns (2) and (3) show some striking differences 
compared to the findings reported for the full sample of firms in column (1). For example, we 
find a positive association (0.3) between earnings inequality and separation in small firms at the 
1% level (column 2), but not in large firms in (column 3). The positive association with worker 
separation is consistent with those who argue (e.g. Cohn et al., 2015) that sizeable wage 
inequality can be a source of worker job dissatisfaction and hence may result in greater 
separations. Indeed our findings suggest that the inequality-dissatisfaction link has an even 
greater weight in small than in large firms. Interestingly, Sunday overtime time work 
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(undesirable work schedules) is associated with a reduced separation risk for small firms (column 
2), but not for large firms (column 3).  
 Finally, we undertake some robustness checks. In one set of exercises, we estimate 
columns (1)-(3) using individual worker total earnings instead of within-firm earnings quartiles. 
In a second set of exercise we exclude the earning-inequality variable. Finally, in a third set of 
exercises, in order to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary separation, we add a measure 
of firm performance (i.e. one-year lagged annual growth rate of total amount of earnings paid by 
firm). In all cases, the findings (not reported here but available upon request) remain qualitatively 
the same.  
  [TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 4 reports findings for blue-collar workers. In contrast to white-collar workers, for 
blue-collar workers we observe both group incentive pay and individual incentive pay in our 
sample. In column (1), where we look at the full sample of firms, we find a negative association 
between separation and individual incentive pay (measured as % of the worker annual earnings). 
The estimated coefficient (-0.001) is statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding is in 
line with our prior expectations as individual incentive scheme is typically used when worker’s 
output can be measured rather easily and accurately, and thus employees know well what is 
expected of them in terms of output. The estimated coefficient on individual incentive pay,  
-0.001, indicates that a 10-percentage-point increase in individual incentive pay is associated with 
about 1 pp decrease in the risk of separation.  
In columns (2)-(3) we again split our blue-collar sample by employer size (cut-off is 100 
workers) and report findings for small and large firm separately. Concerning group incentive pay 
in columns (2) and (3), we continue to find, both for small and for large firms, an insignificant 
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association with worker separation. In a similar vein, in columns (2) and (3) we continue to find 
that individual incentive pay reduces significantly a risk of separation and thus enhances 
employment stability in small and large firms. The parameter estimate is -0.002 for small firms 
(col.(2)) and -0.001 for large firms (col.(3)). The size of each parameter estimate indicates that a 
10-percentage-point increase in the relative size of individual incentive pay is associated with a 
lower of separation (about 2 pp in small firms and about 1 pp in large firms).  
For other covariates, in columns (1)-(3), earnings inequality is insignificantly associated 
with separation. Concerning earning quartiles, workers in the first and second quartiles are about 
0.7 pp more likely to separate than workers in the reference category (Q3); for small firms this 
effect seems to be somewhat more sizeable (about 1.3 pp in column (2)) than for large firms (0.5 
and 0.7 for workers in the first and second quartiles respectively in column (3)). On the other 
hand, workers in the highest earnings quartile (Q4) are about -1.0 pp less likely to separate at 1% 
significance level (compared to ref. category Q3). Undesirable work schedules are negatively 
significant. For example, in column (1), Sunday overtime work is associated with a 2.3 pp and 
shift work a 1.1 pp reduction in separation risk, both at the 1% significance level. Compared to 
prime-aged workers 40-44 years old, age-groups 30-34 and 35-39 years old are positively 
associated with separation at 1% level in column (1). The parameter estimate for the former 
group implies about 2 pp greater risk of separation, while for the latter separation risk is about 
1% smaller. The oldest group of workers (50-53 years old) is associated with about a 17 pp greater 
risk of separation at the 1 % level. These findings are qualitatively similar for small and large firms 
reported in columns (2) and (3); they are also substantially similar to those reported earlier for 
white-collar workers in Table 3. The association between educational level and separation is 
positively significant for all levels of education in columns (1)-(3). Hence, irrespective of 
employer size, compared with the reference group (tertiary-level education), low- and highly-
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educated workers are associated with an enhanced risk of separation. However, compared to large 
firms, workers with a bachelor-level (or above) education face about 4 pp higher risk of 
separation in small firms, while for workers with primary-level education the  separation risk is 
about 1 pp (1.7 pp) greater in small (large) firms, both at the 1% significance level.  
Finally, as robustness checks, we undertake various supplementary exercises. Two 
auxiliary regressions mirror those undertaken for white-collar workers – first we use individual 
worker total earnings instead of within-firm earnings quartiles, and second we add a measure of 
firm performance in order to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary separation. The 
findings (not reported here but available upon request) are qualitatively unchanged. To deal with 
the potential problem posed by blue-collar workers who receive both individual (II) and group 
incentive (GI) pay, in the third regression we add a measure of combined individual and group 
incentive pay (as % of the worker annual earnings). We continue to find that group incentive pay 
is insignificant. The size of individual incentive pay estimate is unchanged. Interestingly, we find 
that combined incentive pay (II&GI) is negatively significant (-0.001) at the 10 % level.  For 
small firms, the results are qualitatively intact for individual and group incentive pay, while 
combined incentive pay is highly insignificant. For large firms, the findings are qualitatively 
similar as those for all firms discussed above.  
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
6. Conclusions and Implications 
Theory is ambiguous as to the expected net effects of different forms of PRP on worker 
separation. In addition, there is reason to believe that institutional context matters and that the 
effects of PRP in CMEs will differ from those in LMEs. By using a large longitudinal data set for 
full-time white-collar and blue-collar male workers in Finland, we are able to provide fresh 
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evidence on the association between worker separation and PRP. These register-based data 
enable us to generate the most rigorous evidence to date on the association between worker 
separation and specific forms of PRP, namely individual incentive pay and group incentive pay. 
Our findings reflect our focusing on two different occupational groups. Also, to account for 
possible heterogeneous effects on separation of PRP among different types of workers, we 
control for the formal level of education and occupation as well as time-invariant heterogeneity 
across firms (productive firms may simply pay their employees more than less-productive firms, 
which may decrease worker turnover).  
The key finding for white-collar male workers is that group incentive pay is associated 
significantly with increased probability of separation and hence diminished employment stability, 
but in large firms only. This finding is consistent with arguments based on line of sight and free 
riding arguments: more distant measures are regarded as more difficult to influence and hence the 
link from effort to reward is unclear. Also the larger the team is, the less motivating the measures 
are. However, our findings are inconsistent with much of the recent literature stressing gift 
exchange and higher commitment coming from profit-sharing systems. Our findings are also 
inconsistent with much of the empirical literature that has tend to find employment stabilizing 
influence from profit-sharing (e.g. Green and Heywood, 2011; O’Halloran, 2012). However, our 
results are consistent with the results of Guthrie (2000), who also found that employee turnover 
was higher under group PRP and that the separation effect of group PRP is more pronounced in 
larger firms.  
For blue-collar male workers our findings reveal a different story. Our results consistently 
indicate that individual incentive pay is associated with a decreased probability of separation and 
hence enhanced employment stability, both in small and large firms. As such, the finding is again 
consistent with the line of sight argument: a clear connection between effort and reward enhances 
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job satisfaction and hence reduces quits. In contrast, the findings are inconsistent with the 
arguments that individual level PRP increases work related stress in a CME. Empirically, our 
findings are consistent with the arguments of Blakemore et al. (1987) and Guthrie (2000). 
Furthermore, our findings of increased separation for white-collar workers versus lower 
separation for blue collar workers under PRP are consistent with white collar workers 
experiencing greater stress in CMEs than do blue collar workers—additional evidence that in 
accounting for differences in empirical findings across various settings, our results suggest that 
outcomes depend on the differing institutional contexts found in CMEs and LMEs.   
Our investigations also reveal a number of interesting findings concerning other 
covariates. Earnings inequality is associated with an increased risk of separation for white-collar 
workers in small firms. Thus for some white-collar workers this finding provides evidence in 
support of the power of the fair wage hypothesis, but no such evidence is found for blue collar 
workers. One potential explanation for this finding is the role of institutional context-- white-
collar worker earnings are less compressed than blue-collar worker earnings in CMEs such as 
Finland. Education is found to influence separation for both groups of workers. As such these 
findings provide some support for both the role of skill biased technical change and the idea of 
job polarization. Consistent with the notion of compensation wage differentials we find that 
undesirable work schedules are always associated with a reduced risk of separation. Consistent 
with several economic studies who find a higher risk of unemployment for older workers (e.g. 
Kyyrä and Wilke 2007), we find a significantly higher risk of separation for older workers.    
We recognize potential limitations in our study. Even though we use longitudinal data 
and, compared to most other pertinent studies, a very large number of observations, we are not 
easily able to distinguish firm-initiated involuntary layoffs from worker-initiated voluntary quits. 
However, we try to minimize the problem by focusing on full-time prime-aged male employees 
27 
 
during a period with no severe economic downturns. Also, in Finland these full-time workers 
enjoy strong employment protection, and in the absence of severe economic downturns during 
the study period, we are reasonably confident that the bulk of separations are voluntary. Also one 
of our robustness exercises introduced a measure of firm performance as a control variable and 
findings were essentially unaffected. In addition, we account for differences across the regions 
that firms operate in by including regional unemployment rates as well as region fixed effects as 
controls. Further, we exclude all worker-year observations of firm disclosure year from our 
sample. We also stress that, on theoretical grounds, the distinction between layoffs and quits is 
ambiguous because employers can always try to hound their workers out of a job. Further, we are 
unable to disaggregate worker transitions to outside of the data into three distinct destinations: 
unemployment, out of labor force, and non-EK firms (e.g., small firms or other sectors). Also we 
do not have information on the characteristics of workers’ families such as partners’ age, earnings 
and the number of children. However, while we may have been unable to fully mitigate these 
limitations, we believe our data allow us to control for the key determinants of separation.  
In some European countries (for instance, the UK), fiscal incentives have been used to 
promote group PRP, such as profit-sharing, and employment stability has been cited as one of the 
reasons for the introduction of such policies. In that case, policymakers ought to be cognizant 
that: (i) not all PP is created equal---individual incentive pay and group incentive pay may affect 
employment stability differently; and (ii) not all workers are affected by PP equally---white-
collar and blue-collar workers respond to performance pay differently. Our study does not lend 
support for fiscal incentives for profit-sharing at least on the grounds of reducing turnover. In 
turn, fiscal incentives have rarely been used to promote individual PRP. 
Finally, the study does not reveal the mechanism why group-based PRP was associated 
with higher employee turnover in a CME, and this could usefully be addressed in a further study. 
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If line-of-sight issues are the main channel, then managers could possibly improve the situation 
by simplifying group PRP systems, and improving communication about their features. Of 
course, a full consideration of these issues would also require a careful consideration and 




















Worker separation (0/1) 0.115 0.319 0 1 
Performance Pay 
Group Incentive Pay (% of worker annual 









Group Incentive Pay (€)  
(if  Group Incentive Pay>0) 
2,238 2,641 0.880 105,946 
Incidence of Group Incentive Pay (0/1) 0.582 0.493 0 1 
Annual real earnings (€)  37,963 12,245 12,879 188,138 
Log(annual real earnings)  10,50 0.295 9.46 12.14 
Undesirable work schedules 









Shift work (0/1) 0.108 0.311 0 1 










30-34 years 0.170 0.376 0 1 
35-39 years 0.185 0.388 0 1 
40-44 years 0.184 0.387 0 1 
45-49 years 0.180 0.384 0 1 
50-53 years 0.197 0.398 0 1 
Worker educational level  









Upper secondary, 11-12 years 0.169 0.374 0 1 
Lowest tertiary, 13-14 years 0.299 0.458 0 1 
Bachelor, 14-16 years 0.271 0.445 0 1 
Master or above, 16-23 years 0.202 0.402 0 1 










50-99 employees 0.142 0.349 0 1 
100-249 employees 0.252 0.434 0 1 
250-499 employees 0.184 0.387 0 1 
500-999 employees 0.141 0.348 0 1 
>1000 employees 0.229 0.420 0 1 
 
Number of firms 
 
565 
   
Number of workers 58,749    
Number of observations 229,117    
Source: Linked Employer-Employee Data from the EK  
Notes: Summary statistics are based on the underlying white-collar male sample, except employer size that is constructed using full white-collar 
sample (i.e. including both female and male workers) to measure more accurately employer size. All figures in the table present unconditional 
sample means (unless indicated otherwise) over the pooled data 1997-2006 that are used in the estimations. Earnings are in real terms (deflated by 













Worker separation (0/1) 0.145 0.352 0 1 
Performance Pay 
Group Incentive Pay (% of worker annual 
earnings if Group Incentive Pay>0) 
4.19 3.19 0.003 42.39 
Individual Incentive Pay (% of worker annual 
earnings if Individual Incentive Earnings>0)  
16.35 4.82 0.003 45.47 
Group Incentive Pay (€)  
(if  Group Incentive Pay>0) 
1,024 822 1 12,867 
Individual Incentive Pay (€)  
(if Individual Incentive Pay>0) 
4,659 1,251 1 14,270 
Incidence of Group Incentive Pay (0/1) 0.164 0.370 0 1 
Incidence of Individual Incentive Pay (0/1) 0.393 0.488 0 1 
Incidence of both Group and Individual 
Incentive Pay (0/1) 
0.249 0.432 0 1 
Annual real earnings (€)  28,868  6,595 11,183 82,675 
Log(annual real earnings)  10.24 0.23  9.32 11.32 
Undesirable work schedules 









Shift work (0/1) 0.855 0.352 0 1 










30-34 years 0.153 0.360 0 1 
35-39 years 0.167 0.373 0 1 
40-44 years 0.181 0.385 0 1 
45-49 years 0.200 0.400 0 1 
50-53 years 0.192 0.394 0 1 
Educational level  









Upper secondary, 11-12 years 0.696 0.460 0 1 
Lowest tertiary, 13-14 years 0.037 0.189 0 1 











50-99 employees 0.107 0.309 0 1 
100-249 employees 0.234 0.424 0 1 
250-499 employees 0.209 0.406 0 1 
500-999 employees 0.170 0.375 0 1 
>1000 employees 0.241 0.428 0 1 
 
Number of firms 
 
660 
   
Number of workers 80,338    
Number of observations 340,344    
Source: Linked Employer-Employee Data from the EK  
Notes: Summary statistics are based on the underlying blue-collar male sample, except employer size that is constructed using full blue-collar 
sample (i.e. including both female and male workers) to measure more accurately employer size. All figures in the table present unconditional 
sample means (unless indicated otherwise) over the pooled data 1997-2006 that are used in the estimations. Earnings are in real terms (deflated by 
the CPI deflator).  
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Table 3. Worker Separation under Performance Pay: White-Collar Workers 
 (1)  
All firms 
(2) 
Small firms (emp.<100) 
(3) 
Large firms (emp.>100) 
Group Incentive Pay (as of Worker Annual 
Total Earnings, %) 




 0.002 * 
(0.001) 

































Undesirable work schedules 



















































Worker educational level  
(ref. lowest tertiary, 13-14 years) 




























Adjusted R2 0.173 0.215 0.171 
Number of firms 565 409 239 
Number of workers 58,749 13,177 48,658 
Number of observations 229,117 44,367 184,750 
Source: Linked Employer-Employee Data from the EK   
Notes: Estimates are based on the linear probability models for male workers for 1997-2005. The dependent variable (0/1) equals one if the 
worker separates in the year t from the firm s/he worked in the previous year t-1, and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted 
for clustering at the firm level. Significance levels: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%, respectively. Earnings Inequality is the within-firm standard deviation 
of worker earnings in a given year. Worker Earnings Quartile is the within-firm worker earnings quartile in a given year. All models also include a 
constant term, 23 industry dummies, year dummies, worker job tenure in 1997 (to control for the length of worker tenure prior to 1997), 5 regional 
dummies, firm dummies (fixed effects), 6 employer size dummies, 3-digit occupational groups and annual regional unemployment rates (%). All 
included covariates are one-year lagged. 
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Table 4. Worker Separation under Performance Pay: Blue-Collar Workers 
 (1)  
All firms 
(3) 
Small firms (emp.<100) 
(3) 
Large firms (emp.>100) 
Group Incentive Pay (as of Worker Annual 







Individual Incentive Pay (as of Worker 








































Undesirable work schedules 








-0.023 ***  
(0.004) 









































Worker educational level (ref.  upper 
secondary, 11-12 years)  
Primary, 6-9 years or missing 
 






0.017 ***  
(0.002) 




 0.015 *** 
(0.004) 




0.034 ***  
(0.010) 
Adjusted R2 0.154 0.190 0.154 
Number of firms 660 406 326 
Number of workers 80,338 14,291 68,587 
Number of observations 340,344 49,867 290,477 
Source: Linked Employer-Employee Data from the EK   
Notes: Estimates are based on the linear probability models for male workers for 1997-2005. The dependent variable (0/1) equals one if the 
worker separates in the year t from the firm s/he worked in the previous year t-1, and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted 
for clustering at the firm level. Significance levels: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%, respectively. Earnings Inequality is the within-firm standard deviation 
of worker earnings in a given year. All models also include a constant term, 23 industry dummies, year dummies, worker job tenure in 1997, 5 
regional dummies, firm dummies (fixed effects), 6 employer size dummies, 3-digit occupational groups and annual regional unemployment rates 
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1 To be able to take into account this difference is an important issue because the presence of PRP (0/1) is a 
rather coarse measure for the magnitude of monetary incentives PRP provides for an individual worker, in 
particular when deciding whether or not to continue an ongoing employment match. 
2 Due to some differences in the way the wage records are set up, our data are not fully comparable between 
white-collar and blue-collar workers. It is also likely that the determinants of the separation process differ 
between white-collar and blue-collar workers. We therefore analyze white-collar and blue-collar samples 
separately. 
3 Relatedly, female labor market decisions (e.g. job mobility) may be affected by the presence of young children 
and women who have just given birth may decide to interrupt their employment spell in order to stay at home 
with their children --- for example, Erosa et al., (2002) find that fertility decisions produce important gender 
differences in employee turnover rates. Perhaps more importantly, our data do not allow us to distinguish 
between “true” female exits from the ongoing job match and female exits from the ongoing job match due to 
family reasons such as a decision to stay at home to take care of their young children.  
4 In so doing we are aware that a worker’s firm ID code can change for reasons other than worker separations. 
For example, mergers and acquisitions of firms often result in firm ID changes for those workers affected, in 
spite of the fact that they are still working in the same workplace under the same employment contract. To 
respond to this potential problem, we verify whether all workers exit from a firm in a given year (i.e. the firm ID 
changes for all the workers of the firm). If so, we exclude these worker-year observations from the sample (but 
keep all the preceding years of observations). 
5 As discussed later, note that we control for regional economic conditions by regional unemployment rates and 
heterogeneity across firms by firm fixed effects. We also exclude worker separations due to plant closures from 
the sample. Further, we try to address this in our unreported regressions (see pp. 20 and 22) where we consider 
individual firm performance (proxied by growth of total earnings paid by the firm) as an additional covariate 
and our results were largely unaffected.    
6 We do not include individual earnings in the basic separation model, since it is potentially an endogenous 
explanatory variable with individual earnings probably correlated with individual innate ability (in the error 
term) as well as worker separation (dependent variable). However, in unreported regressions, we do estimate 
specifications in which we also include individual earnings as an explanatory variable. The reported key 
findings are largely intact.    
7 In the EK data information on worker education come from Statistics Finland. The level of education consists 
of six categories (unknown, primary, upper secondary, lowest tertiary, bachelor, and master or higher). We 
combine the two lowest-level education categories (i.e. unknown and primary) in our analysis.  
8 Somewhat surprisingly, in our sample 26% of blue-collar workers may have received both group and 
individual incentive pay in a given year. For empirical analysis, this combined performance pay variable is a 
potential concern since it may be highly correlated with both individual and group incentive pay, making the 
estimates less precise. Also, the association of this combined variable with worker separation is an aggregate of 
individual and group incentive effects, which would make its interpretation difficult. We therefore do not 
include this combined performance pay variable in our models. We did, however, some additional robustness 
checks to respond to this issue (see p. 22).  
                                                 
